note to 'In fact, the power of the understanding is inhibitory, and is exhibited rather in the hindrance of passion-prompted action, and in the guidance of our impulses, than in the instigation of conduct ; its office being in the individual as in the race, according to Comte, not to impart the habitual impulsion, but deliberative.' (134); '"But we must frankly admit, on consideration, that the political rule of intelligence is hostile to human progression. Mind must tend more and more to the supreme direction of affairs ; but it can never attain it, owing to the imperfection of our organism, in which the intellectual life is the feeblest part ; and thus it appears that the real office of mind is deliberative ; that is, to moderate the material preponderance, and not to impart its habitual impulsion." — Comte, Positive Philosophy, vol. ii. p. 210.' (145)

'every so-called emotion, when carried to a certain pitch, becomes a veritable passion. If it were thought well to distinguish them in a special analysis of the particular emotions, as it doubtless would be, the ground of distinction would be in the egoistic or altruistic character of them — names by which Comte distinguishes respectively those feelings which have entire reference to self and those which have reference to the good of others.' (141)