note to 'In fact, the power of the understanding is inhibitory, and is exhibited rather in the hindrance of passion-prompted action, and in the guidance of our impulses, than in the instigation of conduct ; its office being in the individual as in the race, according to Comte, not to impart the habitual impulsion, but deliberative.' (134); '"But we must frankly admit, on consideration, that the political rule of intelligence is hostile to human progression. Mind must tend more and more to the supreme direction of affairs ; but it can never attain it, owing to the imperfection of our organism, in which the intellectual life is the feeblest part ; and thus it appears that the real office of mind is deliberative ; that is, to moderate the material preponderance, and not to impart its habitual impulsion." — Comte, Positive Philosophy, vol. ii. p. 210.' (145)

'every so-called emotion, when carried to a certain pitch, becomes a veritable passion. If it were thought well to distinguish them in a special analysis of the particular emotions, as it doubtless would be, the ground of distinction would be in the egoistic or altruistic character of them — names by which Comte distinguishes respectively those feelings which have entire reference to self and those which have reference to the good of others.' (141)

note to 'There is no difference, indeed, as Spinoza observes, between appetite and desire, except in so far as the latter implies consciousness; desire is self-conscious appetite.' (131); 'Le désir, c'est l'appétit, avec conscience de lui-même. Il résulte de tout cela que ce qui fonde l'effort, vouloir, l'appétit, le désir, ce n'est pas qu'on ait jugé qu'une chose est bonne: mais, au contraire, on juge qu'une chose est bonne par cela même qu'on y tend par l'effort, le vouloir, l'appétit, le désir." - Spinoza, Des Passions, Schol. to Prop. ix.' (145)

note to 'it certainly must be allowed that there is something in the emotion more special than the general feeling either of pleasure or pain... It is, in reality, the specific character of the idea which determines the specific character of the emotion ; and accordingly emotions are as many and various as ideas.' (136); '"Autant il y a d'espèce d'objets qui nous affectent, autant il faut reconnaître d'espèces de joie, de tristesse, et de désir; et en général de toutes les passions qui sont composées de celles-là, comme la fluctuation, par exemple, ou qui en dérivent, comme l'amour, la haine, l'espérance, la crainte," &c. — Spinoza, Des Passions.' (145)

note to 'Experience proves that the customs and religions of different nations differ most widely; what one nation views as crime, another praises as virtue; what one nation glorifies in as a legitimate pleasure, another reprobates as a shameful vice: there is scarcely a single crime or vice that has not been exalted into a religious observance by one nation or other at one period or other of the world's history. How much, then, is the moral feeling or conscience dependent upon the due educational development of the mind!' (138); '"Mais il faut en outre remarquer ici qu'il n'est nullement surprenant que la tristesse accompagne tous les actes qu'on a continue d'appeler mauvais, et la joie tous ceux qu'on nomme bons. On conçoit en effet par ce qui précède que tout cela dépend surtout de l'éducation. Les parents, en blâtmant certaines actions, et réprimandant souvent leurs enfants pour les avoir commises, et au contraire en louant et en conseillant d'autres actions, ont si bien fait que la tristesse accompagne toujours celles-là et la joie toujours celles-ci. L'experience confirme cette explication. La coutume et la religion no sont pas les mêmes pour tous les hommes: ce qui est sacré pour les  uns est profane pour les autres, et les choses honnêtes chez un peuple sont honteuses chez un autre peuple. Chacun se repent donc ou se glorifie d'une action suivant l'éducation qu'il a reçue." — Spinoza, Des Passions, p. 159.' (145)

'Spinoza, whose admirable account of the passions has never yet been surpassed, and certainly will not easily be surpassed, only recognises three primitive passions, on the basis of which all others are founded - joy, sorrow, and desire. (a) Desire, he says, is the very nature or essence of the individual, whence it is that the joy or sorrow of each individual differs from that of another as the nature or essence of one differs from that of another. (b) Joy is the passage from a less degree of perfection to a greater degree of perfection, and accompanies, therefore, all actions that are called good. (c) Sorrow is the passage from a greater degree of perfection to a less degree of perfection, and accompanies all acts that are called evil.' (141)

'it may be fitly said, with Bacon, "that the mind in its own nature would  be temperate and staid, if the affections, as winds, did not put it in tumult and perturbation.' (133)

note to 'the specific chartacter of the emotion... It is, in reality, the specific character of the idea which determines the specfic character of the emotion; and accordingly emotions are as many and various as ideas.' (136); '"For it is not his disputations about pleasure and pain that can satisfy this inquiry ; no more than he who should generally handle the nature of light can be said to handle the nature of particular colours ; for pleasure and pain are to the particular affections as light is to particular colours." — Bacon, de Augment. Scient.' (145)

note to 'By looking to the end which is desirable, an act naturally very distasteful, but which is necessary as means, may, by habituation, be rendered indifferent or even pleasing ; and many scoundrels are thus gradually fashioned, themselves unaware of the grievous issue in which many slight effects have imperceptibly culminated.' (142-143);

'Nemo repente fuit turpissimus is really the expression of the physical nature
of the growth of character. 

"Custom .... 

Constrains e'en stubborn Nature to obey;
Whom dispossessing oft he doith essay
To govern in her right; and with a pace
So soft and gentle does he win his way,
That she unawares is caught in his embrace,
And tho' deflowered and thralled nought feels her foul disgrace."

Stanza of Gilbert West, quoted by Coleridge in his Biographia Literaria.' (143)

'Among so many dangers, then, "to have a care of one's self is," in the words of Hobbes, "so far from being a matter  scornfully to be looked at, that one has neither the power nor wish to have done otherwise. For every, man. is desirous of what is good for him, and shuns what is evil, but chiefly the chiefest of natural evils, which is death; and this he doth by a  certain impulsion of nature, no less than that whereby a stone  moves downwards."' (130-131)