Cited by T. Quick, 'Disciplining Physiological Psychology: Cinematographs as Epistemic Devices, 1897-1922', Science in Context 30 (4), pp. 423-474.
Description:

'Canales identifies a contentious set of debates between Bergson, his fellow Nobel laureate Albert Einstein, and their respective followers as the immediate cause of the decline in influence of the former. In so doing, her work opens up Bergson's philosophy to historians of science, medicine and technology. Along with that of Bruno Latour (2005) and Robert Brain, (2015, esp. 32-36) it is concerned with it not in relation to the articulation of a normative conception of existence, but rather insofar as it participated in broader intellectual and cultural developments. [note: 'For prior historical consideration of Bergson see e.g. Grogin 1988; Antliff 1993; Gilles 1996.']'

 

Relevant passage from Latour:

 

'We never encounter time and space, but a multiplicity of interactions with actants having their own timing, spacing, goals, means and ends...

But how do we register these many differences in timings and relative resistance? Through the various instruments invented by many scientific disciplines - in the largest sense of the word - to record and document them, and this is where we have to shift from technology studies to science studies. In what may be the most unfair account of science given by any philosopher, Bergson criticised science for being unable to pay attention to duration, to "la durée," because, according to him, scientists always turn it into meaningless and timeless spatial delineations. Bergson would have addressed the theme of this conference - Mind and Time - in a much less polite way than I, since for him there is one thing the mind can never think of, and that is time. Extravagant claim, since scientists are the ones who made it possible to speak of the "longue durée," of the eons of geology and biology out of which the very same Bergson made his "creative evolution." Without Linnaeus, without Cuvier, without Lamarck, without Darwin, there would be no long history of life for Bergson to pit against the obsession with geometry and space. The very idea of evolution unfolding over billions of years emerges out of no other site than the natural history museums and the collections of geologists. What Bergson puts aside when he makes the vain opposition between the warm and rich duration of time and the poor and cold spatialization of mind is the work of registering differences, the work of the clever scientists, another labour which the philosophers have ignored as much as that of the able engineers.' (181)