'There can be little wonder then that both James and Bergson found the claims made by the other so appealing (see e.g. Loerzer 2014). James, like Bergson, accorded affective and non-rational states a foundational role in perception. Both portrayed the vital body in terms of vibratory resonances with their surroundings. Both found the claims made for sensory association problematic. And both sought to put in their place a conception of mind in which the affective body enjoyed far greater psychological prominence than it had hitherto. Where Bergson appealed to intuition, James advocated emotional sensation. Both concepts suggested that the only means by which bodily nature could be apprehended without disturbing its nature were ultimately dependent on the experiencing subject (Carroy and Schmidgen 2002, 5 and 13). Bergson and James prominently proclaimed their mutual admiration, with James devoting lectures to Bergson, and Bergson writing the preface to the French translation of Pragmatism in 1911.'